Application Note

Secure Boot on C2000 Devices

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ABSTRACT

This application report discusses how the secure flash boot feature present on F2838x devices can be used to perform an application boot from flash with an additional security layer of boot code authentication before the actual code execution. This document also applies to the F28003x, F280013x, F280015x, F28P55x, F28P551x, and F28P65x device families.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Trademarks

1 Introduction

The TMS320F2838x is a powerful 32-bit floating-point Real-Time microcontroller designed for advanced closed-loop control applications such as industrial motor drives; solar inverters and digital power; electrical vehicles and transportation; sensing and signal processing. The device supports dual-core C28x architecture along with a new Connectivity Manager (CM) that offloads critical communication tasks, significantly boosting system performance. While the hardware efficiency of these Real-Time microcontrollers enables powerful applications, it is the code that creates the specific and unique application. The Dual Code Security Module (DCSM) built into this device to help you create a secure solution, contains a Secure Boot feature that enhances your ability to prevent unauthorized updates from running your application.

The DCSM implements a dual security zone concept, where the security configuration that is programmed in the One Time Programmable (OTP) region of the flash decides Zone1/Zone2/Unsecure allotment of securable resources (Flash sectors and RAMs). In addition to this, a Zone1/Zone2 resource can also be configured as EXEONLY, which allows only code execution from that region.

For more details, see the *DCSM* chapter of the *TMS320F2838x Technical Reference Manual* [1].

2 Secure Flash Boot Overview

One of the DCSM features related to the application flash boot is the ability to authenticate the user application code in flash before execution. This ascertains the integrity of the application code by ensuring that it has not been tampered with, after getting programmed into the Flash memory. When applied to a Zone1 EXEONLY Flash Sector, this feature acts as an additional layer of security for the critical user application code. The secure flash boot feature provides a set of additional boot options alongside the traditional flash boot options.

The secure flash boot is realized using the 128-bit AES-CMAC Authentication algorithm that is run on the application code contents returning a pass/fail status and proceeds to execute the application code only if the authentication succeeds. Table 2-1 gives an overview of this feature on the different subsystems of the device. The BootROM of each CPU subsystem initiates the authentication of the first 16KB of the application code of that subsystem, which is referred to as Primary Secure Boot. The authentication of the application code beyond the first 16KB of each CPU subsystem is referred to as the Extended Secure Boot. This can be optionally initiated by the pre-authenticated application code.

Due to the execution of the CMAC authentication algorithm during secure flash boot, the boot up sequence requires additional time to reach the user application compared to normal (non-secure) flash boot. Note that the device CM core secure flash boot requires less time compared to the CPU1 or CPU2 secure flash boot implementations since the CM makes use of a hardware AES accelerator.

Table 2-1. Secure Flash Boot Overview Across the Device

Subsystem (Core)	Secure Boot Feature	CMAC Algorithm Implementation	Additional Time Taken to Authenticate First 16KB of Flash Boot Code
CPU1 SS (C28_1)	Yes	Software (Secure ROM utility) + AES ROM tables	~400 ms (Running on INTOSC at 10 MHz)
CPU2 SS (C28_2)	Yes	Software (Secure ROM utility) + AES ROM tables	~20 ms (Running on PLL at 200 MHz)
CMSS (CM4)	Yes	Software (Secure ROM utility) + Hardware AES accelerator	~6 ms (Running on PLL at 125 MHz)

3 CMAC Authentication

Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) is an AES-based authentication algorithm that constructs an authentication tag from a block of input data. The input data block is fed 128 bits at a time, into the crypto engine/software (based on the CPU subsystem), along with a 128-bit CMAC key. The key resides in locations 0x78018-0x7801F of the CPU1 USER OTP and is used by the CMAC authentication algorithm on all cores of the device. The crypto engine/software runs the CMAC algorithm on the entire block of input data and generates the final 128-bit authentication tag.



Figure 3-1. CMAC Operation

4 Secure Flash Boot Options

Table 4-1 shows the different Primary Secure Flash Boot options available on the three cores and their corresponding configurations. The Extended Secure Boot which is initiated by the application code, is explained in Section 7. For more details, see the *ROM Code and Peripheral Booting* chapter of the *TMS320F2838x Technical Reference Manual* [1].

Table 4-1. Secure Flash Boot Mode Configuration Details

Secure Boot Option (1)	BOOTDEFx/ BOOTMODE Value (2)	Flash Entry Point (3)	CPU1/CPU2 Entry Address	CPU1/CPU2 128-Bit Golden CMAC Tag Location	CM Entry Address	CM 128-Bit Golden CMAC Tag Location
Option 0	0x0A	Sector 0	0x00080000	0x00080002	0x00200000	0x00200004
Option 1	0x2A	Sector 4	0x00088000	0x00088002	0x00210000	0x00210004
Option 2	0x4A	Sector 8	0x000A8000	0x000A8002	0x00250000	0x00250004
Option 3	0x6A	Sector 13	0x000BE000	0x000BE002	0x0027C000	0x0027C004

(1) The secure boot options can be independently chosen for CPU1/CPU2/CM.
(2) For CPU1, BOOTDEFx field is part of the Zx-BOOTDEF-LOW/ Zx-BOOTDEF-HIGH CPU1 USER OTP memory locations. For CPU2/CM, BOOTMODE field is part of the CPU1TOCPU2IPCBOOTMODE/CPU1TOCMIPCBOOTMODE registers respectively populated by CPU1 application code.
(3) The secure boot feature is applicable only on Zone1 and hence the chosen flash sector(s) have to be configured as Zone1-EXEONLY. Also, irrespective of the sector size, the Primary Secure Flash boot operates on only the first 16KB of the selected sector. For example, Sector 4 and Sector 8 are 64KB each, but only the first 16KB is considered.

5 Secure Flash Boot Flow

Implementation of secure flash boot on device is a two-step process:

1. **Generation of the authentication tag** – this happens outside the device during image creation.
   a. The C2000™ or Arm®, hex utility runs the CMAC algorithm on the flash boot code image using the input CMACKEY and the CMAC application data structures that preserve the memory space for the golden CMAC authentication tag. For more details on the hex utility, see [3] and [4].
   b. The generated golden CMAC tag is embedded in the hex file at the location specified in Table 4-1.
   c. The hex image (now containing the golden CMAC tag) is programmed into the corresponding sector of the flash.
   d. The appropriate secure flash boot mode is chosen as per Table 4-1 and programmed in the CPU1 USER OTP.
2. **Authentication of the application boot code in flash** – this happens inside the device as part of the Secure Flash Boot execution
   a. The BOOTDEFx/BOOTPINCONFIG fields are configured to select the Secure Flash Boot option according to Table 4-1 and upon a reset, the device boots and execute the CMAC algorithm on the specified flash sector.
   b. The tag generated by the CMAC algorithm is compared with the Golden CMAC tag residing at the preprogrammed location.
   c. Upon a successful tag match, the boot process branches to the authenticated flash code and begins execution.
   d. Upon a tag match failure, different actions are taken on CPU1/CPU2/CM :
      i. In the case of CPU1, the device is reset (the code remains in a loop and XRSn is issued automatically on the Watchdog expiry).
      ii. In the case of CPU2, the secure boot failure flag is set in the CPU2TOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS register, IPC command is sent to CPU1 with secure flash CMAC error code, and the CPU2 boot code waits in a loop for CPU1 to take necessary action. A copy of the CPU2TOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS register is also captured in the 0x0000 0002 address location of CPU2.
      iii. In the case of CM, the secure boot failure flag is set in the CMTOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS register, IPC command is sent to CPU1 with secure flash CMAC error code and the CM boot code waits in a loop for CPU1 to take necessary action. A copy of the CMTOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS register is also captured in the 0x2000 0000 address location of CM.

Note

The CMAC algorithm, while calculating the authentication tag on the image and also while authenticating the image, treats the memory addresses containing the golden tag as all ones.

6 C2000Ware Example Details

In C2000Ware [2], an example is provided to show an application setup for secure flash boot. The example includes secure flash boot application projects for each core. The example additionally details how to authenticate flash code beyond the secure flash boot entry address + 16KB. More details on this custom flash range authentication functionality are explained in the Section 7. This example assumes that the flash sectors to be authenticated are pre-configured as Zone 1 EXEONLY and uses the default CMACKEY for authentication. For details on programming a custom CMACKEY and other DCSM settings in CPU1 USER OTP, see [1] and [2].

C2000Ware Location: <C2000Ware_Install_Directory>/driverlib/f2838x/examples/c28x/boot

Project Names:

- boot_ex1_cpu1_cpu2_cm_secure_flash_cpu1
- boot_ex1_cpu1_cpu2_cm_secure_flash_cpu2
- boot_ex1_cpu1_cpu2_cm_secure_flash_cm

Files Included:

- Source files – Includes main application code
  - Example: boot_ex1_cpu1_cpu2_cm_secure_flash_cpu1.c
- HEX Linker Command files – Provides details of the entire length of flash memory to the c2000 or arm hex utility
  - Example: boot_ex1_flash_hex_lnk_cpu1.cmd
- CMAC key text file – Provides the user CMAC key to the c2000 or arm hex utility
  - Example: boot_ex1_user_cmac_key.txt
  - For more details on the cmac_key format, see [3] and [4].

How to run the example:

1. Load application into CPU1 flash (as well as CPU2 and CM applications).
   a. Load the *.hex file, not the *.out file
2. Disconnect and reconnect to only CPU1.
3. To configure the device to perform secure flash boot upon boot up:
   a. Emulation boot (recommended for example/development)
      i. In CCS memory window, set BOOTPINCONFIG location (0x0D00) to 0x5AFFFFFF and BOOTDEF location (0x0D04) to 0x0000000A
   b. Standalone boot (recommended for deployment)
      i. Program CPU1 USER OTP locations corresponding to BOOTPINCONFIG and BOOTDEF. To learn more, see [1].
4. Reset CPU1 via CCS and click resume.
5. Observe the LEDs on the controlCARD for indicators of success.
   a. When all three cores secure boot successfully and authenticate their full flash memory contents, then three LEDs (one for each core) will be blinking.
6. For cases where the controlCARD isn't used, look out for the following GPIO toggles based on the CPU subsystem:
   a. CPU1 – GPIO31
   b. CPU2 – GPIO34
   c. CM – GPIO145

Application code requirements for golden CMAC Tag generation:

CPU1/CPU2 Golden CMAC Tag Memory Allocation for Secure Flash Boot Option 0

```
// Implementation for CPU1/CPU2
#pragma RETAIN(cmac_sb_1)
#pragma LOCATION (cmac_sb_1, 0x080002)
const char cmac_sb_1[8] = {0};
```

CM Golden CMAC Tag Memory Allocation for Secure Flash Boot Option 0

```
#pragma RETAIN(cmac_sb_1)
#pragma LOCATION (cmac_sb_1, 0x00200004)
const uint8_t cmac_sb_1[16] = {0};
```

Constant char/unsigned integer definitions allocate memory for golden CMAC tags. For more information, see the examples in Section 6:

- Variable naming must be one of the following: cmac_sb_1, cmac_sb_2, cmac_sb_3, cmac_sb_4
  - Further details for C28x can be found in the *TMS320C28x Assembly Language Tools User's Guide* [3]
  - Further details for CM can be found in the *ARM Assembly Language Tools User's Guide* [4].
- Use the LOCATION pragma to specify the address within the intended authentication range for the CMAC golden tag. For CPU1/CPU2, this address must be the entry address + 2 and for CM, this address must be the entry address + 4.
- Leave the variable initialized to zero.

Application setup for using HEX Utility:



Figure 6-1. CPU1 Example Properties With Hex Utility Enabled for CMAC

Each core project enables the hex utility to generate the golden CMAC tag (see Figure 6-1). Flags include:

- “--cmac” provides the path to the user CMAC key text file
- “--image”, “--memwidth”, and “--romwidth” where mem/rom width is set. This should be set to 16 for CPU1/CPU2 and set to 8 for CM
- The paths to the flash HEX linker command file for the corresponding core.

7 Authenticating Flash Code Beyond 16 KB

Thesecure flash boot only authenticates the first 16 KB of the flash sector from the entry address. In order to authenticate other sectors of flash, the user application must call the secure flash boot CMAC API directly.

Using the hex utility, it supports generation of golden CMAC tags for each of the four flash entry addresses + 16KB and 1 custom flash range. The custom flash range is configurable to be able to perform CMAC authentication over a custom address range. This could be the length of all the flash sectors if desired.

CPU1/CPU2 Application CMAC Structure for Custom Flash Range Authentication

```
struct CMAC_TAG
{
   char tag[8];
   uint32_t start;
   uint32_t end;
}
```

CPU1/CPU2 Golden CMAC Tag Memory Allocation for Full Flash Range Authentication

```
#pragma RETAIN(cmac_all)
#pragma LOCATION (cmac_all, 0x087002)
const struct OMAC_TAG cmac_all = {{0}, 0x0, 0x0};
```

CM Application CMAC Structure for Custom Flash Range Authentication

```
struct CMAC_TAG
{
   uint8_t tag[16];
   uint32_t start;
   uint32_t end;
}
```

CM Golden CMAC Tag Memory Allocation for Full Flash Range Authentication

```
#pragma RETAIN(cmac_all)
#pragma LOCATION (cmac_all, 0x00204004)
const struct OMAC_TAG cmac_all = {{0}, 0x0, 0x0};
```

Create a structure called “cmac_all” for creating a custom CMAC authentication range.

- Use the LOCATION pragma to specify any address within the intended authentication range for the CMAC golden tag. (The closer the CMAC golden tag is to the authentication start address, the faster the CMAC algorithm will execute).
- Leave the “tag” struct element to always initialize to zero.
- Initialize the “start” and “end” struct elements to set a custom range. If both are zero, then the full length of the device core flash memory will be authenticated including the 16KB memory range of Primary Secure Boot.
- For additional details on the application CMAC variables/structs, see [3] and [4].

CPU1 Secure Flash CMAC Authentication API

```
applicationCMACStatus = CPU1BROM_calculateCMAC (CMAC_AUTH_START_ADDRESS,
                                                CMAC_AUTH_END_ADDRESS,
                                                CMAC_AUTH_TAG_ADDRESS);
```

In the application, include F2838x secure zone code symbols library to your project (Located in C2000Ware [2] at <C2000Ware_Install_Directory>/libraries/boot_rom/f2838x) and call the secure flash boot CMAC API for the applicable core. An example API call on CPU1 is shown in the example above.

- The CMAC_AUTH_TAG_ADDRESS should match what was provided to the LOCATION pragma
- The CMAC_AUTH_START_ADDRESS and CMAC_AUTH_END_ADDRESS should match what was provided to the “cmac_all” struct. Additionally, it is important to note that the start and end address should align to 128 bits.

- For example, the start and end address for authenticating the full length of F2838x CPU1 flash memory would be:
  - Start: 0x00080000
  - End: 0x000C0000
- The status returned from the secure flash boot CMAC API should then be checked and handled accordingly in the user application.
- For additional details on the Secure Flash CMAC Authentication APIs, see the *ROM Code and Peripheral Booting* chapter of [1].

Note

Even though the end address in the above example is actually 0x000BFFFF, it must be provided as 0x000C0000 so that the end address is aligned to 128 bits.

8 Debug Resources

Table 8-1. Secure Flash Boot Debug Scenarios

Scenario	Behavior
Failed Secure boot in CPU1	Standalone Boot: Device is reset. Emulation Boot: CPU1 halts inside the address range 0x3FB13C – 0x3FB142
Failed Secure boot in CPU2	Bit21 of the CPU2TOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS (1) register will be set. CPU2 sends IPC command to CPU1 with secure flash CMAC error code.
Failed Secure boot in CM	Bit21 of the CMTOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS (2) register will be set. CM sendsIPC command to CPU1 with secure flash CMAC error code.
Has a successful Secure boot run for CPU1?	Bits7:0 of the CPU1 BootROM status residing in the 0x0000 0002address location will reflect 0x3.
Has a successful Secure boot run for CPU2?	Bits7:0 of the CPU2TOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS (1) register will reflect 0x3.
Has a successful Secure boot run for CM?	Bits7:0 of the CMTOCPU1IPCBOOTSTS (2) register will reflect 0x3.

1. Same information is also captured in the 0x0000 0002 address location of CPU2.
2. Same information is also captured in the 0x2000 0000 address location of CM.

9 Additional Information and Points to Consider

- Although not recommended, if secure flash boot is performed on CPU2/CM and not on CPU1, then a dummy load must be performed from CPU1 for the Z1 OTP CMACKEY before releasing CPU2/CM out of reset. The dummy load is done by reading the 0x78018-0x7801F locations of CPU1 USER OTP.
- Similarly, if using the CMAC Authentication APIs without running the secure flash boot mode on CPU1, then a dummy load must be performed from CPU1 for the Z1 OTP CMACKEY before calling the APIs.
- While using Secure Flash Boot on CPU1, it is recommended not to have a normal (non-secure) Flash Boot mode to the same sector configured in the BOOTDEF table.
- For authenticating flash code beyond 16 KB:
  - The 128-bit golden CMAC tag must be stored inside of the memory address range that the calculation is performed on.
  - The starting address of the golden CMAC tag must align to a 32-bit boundary.
- As the boot mode settings reside in the One Time Programmable (OTP), it is recommended to make use of the emulation boot mode for trials before freezing the boot related configuration. More information regarding the Emulation boot is provided in the *ROM Code and Peripheral Booting* chapter of the *TMS320F2838x Technical Reference Manual* [1].

10 Alignment of C2000 CMAC Algorithm to OpenSSL

The C2000™ hex utility (hex2000) applies a proprietary byte-reordering transform, referred to throughout this document as "swapwords", both to the message data prior to CMAC computation and to the resulting authentication tag prior to embedding it in the flash image. This is described in detail in the Section 10.2.

Since OpenSSL's AES-128-CMAC implementation operates on an unmodified, contiguous byte stream without any such reordering, a direct invocation of the *openssl dgst -mac* cmac command on the raw binary will not produce output that matches the golden CMAC tag generated by C2000. This section describes the precise sequence of operations required to bring the output of OpenSSL into alignment with C2000, enabling developers to independently verify or reproduce the golden CMAC tag using standard, open-source cryptographic tooling.

Note that this alignment procedure is intended for use in development and verification workflows. It is not a replacement for the hex2000 utility in production image generation. For details on the *hex2000 --cmac* flags and key file format, see [3] and [4].

10.1 C28x Memory and Binary File Byte Ordering

The C28x CPU is 16-bit word-addressed (not byte-addressable). Each C28x word is 16 bits wide. In the binary file, each 16-bit word is stored little-endian (low byte at lower file offset).

How a 32-bit value appears in the binary file

A C28x uint32_t value 0xAABBCCDD stored at word address N:

```
C28x word address N:   value = 0xCCDD  (low 16 bits)
C28x word address N+1: value = 0xAABB  (high 16 bits)

Binary file bytes:
  offset 2k+0: 0xDD  ← low  byte of word[N]
  offset 2k+1: 0xCC  ← high byte of word[N]
  offset 2k+2: 0xBB  ← low  byte of word[N+1]
  offset 2k+3: 0xAA  ← high byte of word[N+1]
```

So uint32_t 0xAABBCCDD appears in the binary file as: DD CC BB AA

Example: codestart branch instruction

The "LB 0x081BC8" instruction at C28x 0x080000:

```
C28x word 0x080000: 0x4800  → binary bytes: 00 48
C28x word 0x080001: 0x1BC8  → binary bytes: C8 1B

Binary file at offset 0: 00 48 C8 1B
```

10.2 Flash Binary Byte Ordering

The hex2000 utility does not feed the flash binary directly to the AES-128-CMAC algorithm. Before computing the authentication tag, it applies the *swapwords* transform, which swaps the two 16-bit words within each 32-bit group of the binary data.

For each group of 4 consecutive bytes [b0, b1, b2, b3] in the binary, where:

- [b0, b1] = [low byte, high byte] of C28x word at address N
- [b2, b3] = [low byte, high byte] of C28x word at address N+1

```
swapwords([b0, b1, b2, b3]) = [b2, b3, b0, b1]
```

This swaps the two 16-bit words within each 32-bit group, keeping each word's bytes in their natural (little-endian) order. This is equivalent to reading each pair of C28x words in reverse order (high word at N+1 before low word at N). This operation is self-invertible, meaning that applying the transformation twice to any input returns the original data unchanged.

After the AES-128-CMAC tag has been computed over the transformed data, hex2000 applies the same swapwords transform a second time to the 16-byte tag itself before embedding it in the flash image at the golden CMAC tag location (byte offset +0x4 from the flash bank entry address, corresponding to C28x word address +0x2). Both of these transforms must be replicated when using OpenSSL in order to produce a stored tag that is byte-for-byte identical to the one generated by hex2000.

10.3 CMAC Key Byte Ordering

The 128-bit CMAC key is provisioned in the DCSM Zone 1 OTP as four 32-bit registers (DCSM_Z1_CMACKEY0 through DCSM_Z1_CMACKEY3), where CMACKEY0 holds the most-significant 32 bits and CMACKEY3 holds the least-significant 32 bits.

The hex2000 key text file format concatenates these four values in order from most-significant to least-significant and prepends the "0x" prefix. OpenSSL's *-macopt hexkey:<32-hex-key>* option accepts the same 32-character hexadecimal string directly, without any additional reordering of the bytes. Table 10-1 illustrates the correspondence between OTP register values, the hex2000 key file format, and the OpenSSL hexkey argument.

Table 10-1. CMAC Key Byte Order Correspondence

OTP Register	Value (Example)	Role
DCSM_Z1_CMACKEY0	0x2b7e1516	Key bits [127:96] (MSW)
DCSM_Z1_CMACKEY1	0x28aed2a6	Key bits [95:64]
DCSM_Z1_CMACKEY2	0xabf71588	Key bits [63:32]
DCSM_Z1_CMACKEY3	0x09cf4f3c	Key bits [31:0] (LSW)
hex2000 key file	0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c	Single-line, 0x-prefixed
OpenSSL hexkey	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c	Same value, no 0x-prefix

10.4 CMAC Output Alignment Procedure

Reproducing the hex2000 golden CMAC tag using OpenSSL is a five-step process. Each step is described below.

Step 1 — Obtain the pre-signing binary.

Begin with the 16 KB (0x4000-byte) flash binary prior to CMAC signing. In this state, the 16-byte golden CMAC tag placeholder (cmac_sb_1) at byte offset 0x4 must be initialized to all zeros, consistent with the application source code requirement described in Section 6. The remainder of the 16 KB region should reflect the intended flash contents, with unprogrammed areas filled with 0xFF.

Step 2 — Mask the golden CMAC tag area.

The CMAC golden signature is stored within the 16 KB region that CMAC covers. To avoid a circular dependency (the tag depends on itself), the signature area is masked with all ones (0xFFFF) during CMAC computation. Erased flash on C28x devices reads as all ones. By masking the signature area, the CMAC computation treats the signature location as if it were erased flash. This is consistent with the initial state of the flash before programming.

Accordingly, before computing the CMAC, replace bytes 0x4 through 0x13 (inclusive) with the value 0xFF. This masking step must be performed regardless of whether hex2000 or OpenSSL is used for the computation, and is consistent with the behavior described in Section 5.

Step 3 — Apply the swapwords transform to produce the OpenSSL input.

Apply the swapwords byte reordering to the entire 16 KB masked binary. For each group of four consecutive bytes [b0, b1, b2, b3], write [b2, b3, b0, b1] in its place. Write the resulting 16 KB byte sequence to a temporary file (for example, input_swapped.bin). This transformed file constitutes the direct input to the OpenSSL CMAC command.

Step 4 — Compute AES-128-CMAC using OpenSSL.

Invoke OpenSSL as follows, substituting the appropriate 32-character hexadecimal key string:

OpenSSL Command to Compute AES-128-CMAC over Transformed Input

```
openssl dgst -mac cmac \
             -macopt cipher:AES-128-CBC \
             -macopt hexkey:<32-hex-key> \
             -binary input_swapped.bin > aes_tag.bin
```

The output file aes_tag.bin will contain exactly 16 bytes representing the raw AES-128-CMAC tag. This value corresponds to the internal tag computed by hex2000 before the tool applies its final transform.

Step 5 — Apply swapwords to the tag to obtain the stored format.

Apply the same swapwords transform to the 16-byte AES tag produced in Step 4. The resulting 16 bytes constitute the golden CMAC tag in the storage format used by hex2000 and expected by the Boot ROM. This value should match the bytes written by hex2000 at byte offset 0x4 in the signed flash image, and it is the value that the Boot ROM reads from the golden CMAC tag location at 0x00080002 (C28x word address) during authentication.

Note that because swapwords is self-invertible, the Boot ROM recovers the original AES tag simply by reading the stored tag and applying swapwords once more before comparing it against the tag it has recomputed over the masked, transformed flash contents.

10.5 Worked Example

The following example uses the NIST AES-128 test key 2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c applied to a minimal flash image. The first application word (offset 0x0) is the "LB 0x081BC8" branch instruction assembled as the two C28x words "0x4800" and "0x1BC8". The golden CMAC tag placeholder at offset 0x4 is initialized to zeros. Fields at offset 0x14 and beyond are at their erased state (0xFF). The remainder of the 16 KB region is filled with 0xFF.

Pre-signing binary (first 24 bytes shown; remainder is 0xFF):

```
Offset 0x0000:  00 48 C8 1B   (codestart: LB 0x081BC8)
Offset 0x0004:  00 00 00 00   (cmac_sb_1, initialized to zero)
Offset 0x0008:  00 00 00 00   (cmac_sb_1, continued)
Offset 0x000C:  00 00 00 00   (cmac_sb_1, continued)
Offset 0x0010:  00 00 00 00   (cmac_sb_1, continued)
Offset 0x0014:  FF FF FF FF   (erased contents)
```

After Step 2 — Signature area masked with 0xFF:

```
Offset 0x0000:  00 48 C8 1B   (unchanged)
Offset 0x0004:  FF FF FF FF   (masked)
Offset 0x0008:  FF FF FF FF   (masked)
Offset 0x000C:  FF FF FF FF   (masked)
Offset 0x0010:  FF FF FF FF   (masked)
Offset 0x0014:  FF FF FF FF   (unchanged)
```

After Step 3 — swapwords applied (first 8 bytes shown):

```
Offset 0x0000:  C8 1B 00 48   ([b2,b3,b0,b1] of original offset 0x0000)
Offset 0x0004:  FF FF FF FF   (unchanged; all bytes identical)
```

Step 4 — OpenSSL AES-128-CMAC output (aes_tag.bin, 16 bytes):

```
f2 70 99 41  e1 cf 3c cf  f1 36 7a a3  c4 3e f6 f7
```

After Step 5 — swapwords applied to tag (stored format):

```
99 41 f2 70  3c cf e1 cf  7a a3 f1 36  f6 f7 c4 3e
```

Final signed binary (first 32 bytes):

```
Offset 0x0000:  00 48 C8 1B
Offset 0x0004:  99 41 F2 70   (stored tag bytes 0-3)
Offset 0x0008:  3C CF E1 CF   (stored tag bytes 4-7)
Offset 0x000C:  7A A3 F1 36   (stored tag bytes 8-11)
Offset 0x0010:  F6 F7 C4 3E   (stored tag bytes 12-15)
Offset 0x0014:  FF FF FF FF
```

The stored tag above matches the output of *hex2000 --cmac* applied to the same binary using the same key. This result has been verified to be byte-for-byte identical to hex2000 output.

10.6 Summary of Differences

The only behavioral differences between the *hex2000 --cmac* signing flow and a raw invocation of the OpenSSL AES-128-CMAC command are the two swapwords transforms that wrap the AES operation. The underlying cryptographic algorithm, key schedule, and initialization vector are identical in both cases. Table 10-2 summarizes the complete correspondence between the two flows for reference.

Table 10-2. Comparison of C2000 and OpenSSL CMAC Flows

Aspect	C2000	OpenSSL
Message pre-processing	swapwords(masked_binary) applied before AES	Raw byte stream; no transform applied
Signature area masking	Byte offsets 0x4–0x13 replaced with 0xFF	Must be applied manually before invoking OpenSSL
Key byte order	MSB-first (CMACKEY0 || ... || CMACKEY3)	MSB-first; same order, no conversion needed
AES-128-CMAC algorithm	NIST SP 800-38B (OMAC1)	NIST SP 800-38B (OMAC1); identical
Initialization vector	All zeros (implicit in CMAC standard)	All zeros (implicit in CMAC standard)
Tag post-processing	swapwords(aes_tag) applied before embedding	Raw AES tag output; swapwords must be applied manually
Output	Signed binary with embedded stored tag	16-byte raw AES tag; further processing required

Note

The swapwords transform operates on 32-bit groups and therefore requires that the authenticated region length be a multiple of four bytes. The 16 KB (0x4000-byte) C28x Primary Secure Boot region satisfies this requirement. When performing extended authentication over a custom flash range as described in Section 7, the start and end addresses must similarly align to 128 bits in order for the CMAC algorithm to operate correctly without padding.

11 References

1. Texas Instruments: *TMS320F2838x Real-Time Microcontrollers Technical Reference Manual*
2. C2000Ware for C2000 Real-Time MCUs
3. Texas Instruments: *TMS320C28x Assembly Language Tools v20.2.0.LTS User's Guide*
4. Texas Instruments: *Arm Assembly Language Tools v20.2.0.LTS User's Guide*
5. TMS320F28338D Product Page

12 Revision History

Changes from Revision * (September 2020) to Revision A (June 2026)	Page
• Updated secure boot support on newer C2000 devices	1
• Updated the numbering format for tables, figures, and cross-references throughout the document	2
• Added section detailing C2000 implementation's alignment to OpenSSL	9

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