



ABSTRACT

In this document, we will introduce Jacinto 7 safety fundamentals and the collateral TI provides for customers' functional safety implementation.

Jacinto SoCs are developed as a functional Safety Element Out of Context (SEooC) via ISO26262/IEC61508 processes to achieve ASIL-D/SIL-3 systematic fault integrity and includes hardware diagnostics to achieve up ASIL-D/SIL-3 random fault integrity. The device has gone through safety assessment by a certified third party (TUV-SUD) and a certificate will be provided.

Systematic capability	Built-in diagnostics, low FIT	Certification support
<p>Up to ASIL-D / SIL-3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Integrated Safety MCU• Independently certified hardware and software development processes• Requirements tracking• Documentation• Validation	<p>Up to ASIL-D / SIL-3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Asymmetric multi-processing• Lockstep CPUs• Memory SECDED ECC• Interconnect protection• MPU/MMU/firewalls• Voltage/clock/reset monitors• Voltage temperature monitors• Logic/memory BIST• Built-in tests for diagnostics <p>...and more.</p>	<p>Functional Safety Design Package</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Safety manual• Safety analysis report• Configurable FMEDA• Software compliance support Packages (CSPs)• 3rd party safety element out of context (SEooC) assessment

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1 Jacinto™ 7 Safety Architecture Concepts

For a full architectural overview of the Jacinto devices please review the device technical reference manual of the respective SoC. Jacinto 7 SoCs target mixed criticality with a heterogeneous architecture and are scalable in terms performance, peripheral, and functional safety requirements. Each device within the Jacinto family will have a slightly different partitioning of safety components as well as safety targets, this is summarized within [Table 1](#).

Table 1. Safety Integrity Table

	Main Domain	MCU Domain	Extended MCU Island	Total ASIL-D/SIL-3 DMIPs
DRA829/TDA4VM	ASIL-B/SIL-2	ASIL-D/SIL-3	N/A	Up to 2K
DRA821	ASIL-B/SIL-2	ASIL-D/SIL-3	ASIL-D/SIL-3	Up to 4K




Figure 1. DRA821 Device

1.1 Safety Architectural Overview: MCU Island and Extended MCU Island

The entire chip achieves systematic fault integrity of ASIL-D/SIL-3. The random fault metric integrity of each respective domain assumes that sufficient hardware diagnostics are used in conjunction with recommended software/system diagnostics and assumptions of use (AoU) are implemented.

MCU Island: Jacinto 7 family of products integrates a safety MCU inside the SoC to perform monitoring of safety critical functions and signals. This is referred to as the MCU island and is shown in the block diagram above in green. The MCU island provides a safety partition with sufficient hardware diagnostics in place to achieve random fault integrity of ASIL-D/SIL-3. It is comprised of a pair of R5F cores which can be operated in lockstep, safe interconnects for intra-domain communication, as well as a diverse set of peripherals.

Extended MCU Island: On some devices within the Jacinto 7 family (please see Table 1: Safety Scalability Table) an extended MCU island is present. This partition is shown in green in the block diagram above and increases ASIL-D/SIL-3 performance with additional R5F core(s) for increased ASIL-D/SIL-3 DMIPs as well as additional instances of peripherals that can achieve random fault integrity of ASIL-D/SIL-3. The extended MCU also enables up to ASIL-D/SIL-3 access to DDR, which is beneficial if safe data access is required and on-chip memory within the safety island or extended safety island is not sufficient.

The rest of the SOC (main domain as show in the grey areas of Figure 1) achieves random fault integrity requirements of up to ASIL-B/SIL-2.

1.2 Implementing Mixed Criticality - Freedom from Interference (FFI)

When mixed ASIL components co-exist in a system, ISO26262 mandates freedom from interference. This prevents cascading faults from lower criticality elements from affecting higher criticality elements. The Jacinto family of products implement several architectural features to facilitate FFI.

- **HW Isolation:** The MCU Safety Island is an independent domain with a high degree of FFI from the rest of the SoC. This is accomplished via separate voltage, clock, and reset domains as well as its own dedicated set of peripherals and resources. The MCU domain can still continue to operate on safety critical functions if the main domain crashes, hangs, or needs to be reset.
- **Firewalls:** A Firewall is a module that restricts access of incoming bus transactions based on configuration settings. Firewalls can be configured for certain policies to ensure that non-safe or less safe components will not be able to access or manipulate safety critical cores, peripherals, or memory. Policies can be set to monitor an incoming transaction's address and attributes (Read, Write, Secure, etc.) to either block or allow access.
- **Isolation Gaskets:** The MCU island and extended MCU island have isolation gaskets in place which serve as fault tolerant connections to less safety critical resources that are shared throughout the SoC.
- **PVU/MMU:** In addition to enabling features like virtualization, MMUs help separate memory paths via memory mapping to allow mixed criticality use cases. The module can be configured to ensure that less safety critical cores can only access its own address space and peripherals.

2 Overview of Safety Mechanisms

For system level safety, robust hardware diagnostics for basic operations are layered with system and software diagnostic to meet random fault integrity metrics on the SoC. There are three basic categories of diagnostic coverage:

- *Hardware safety mechanisms:* Once enabled, these mechanisms operate continuously.
 - Examples of this include but are not limited to: SECDED ECC and Parity for memories and interconnect, PLL slip and loss of lock detection, over/under-voltage detection.
- *Hardware + Software safety mechanisms:* These mechanisms depend on hardware but require periodic software interaction to initiate or maintain the operation.
 - Examples of this include but are not limited to: watchdog timers, CRC hardware support for checks of memory and registers, dual clock comparators.
- *Software safety mechanisms:* These mechanisms are based on software performing some test and checking the results.
 - Examples of this include but are not limited to: Information redundancy techniques, transmission redundancy, software test of basic functionality. Implementation of these mechanisms are usually dependent on customer application and use case.




Figure 2. Select Diagnostics on TDA4VM

Figure 2 demonstrates some safety mechanisms that can be implemented in the SoC (based of TDA4VM). This diagram is for informational purposes only and is not all inclusive. Please refer to SoC specific Safety Reference Manual for in depth descriptions of the diagnostics as well as for SOC specific modules and peripherals.

3 Implementation of Safety in Your System

3.1 Hardware Collateral

TI provides comprehensive collateral and deliverables to enable safety support and certification of the SoC as a Safety Element out of Context (SEoC) in a system.

- **Device Safety Manual:** Details product safety architecture and recommended usage Used during the system design process
- **Safety Analysis Report:** Summary of FIT rates and diagnostic coverage at the device level according to IEC 61508 and/or ISO 26262.
- **FMEDA (Failure Mode, Effects, Diagnostics Analysis):** The FMEDA is a fully customizable document that is used to ensure a safety use case meets target metrics and safety goals as defined by the customer during their safety analysis. Used during the end of the system design process
- **Assessment Certificate:** Summary of compliance to IEC 61508 and/or ISO 26262 Used as a part of system safety case

A customer must have a valid Safety NDA in place to access aforementioned safety documents. The documentation is available via mysecuresw and access can be [requested here](#).

3.2 Software Support

To enable customers on their safety journey, TI provides a [ASIL-D/SIL-3 safety assessed](#) Software Diagnostic Library (SDL) that covers system level diagnostics and safety features. The SDL is a collection of initialization/configuration, self-test, runtime, and response handler APIs that support various safety mechanisms. It is a fully self-contained library with no dependency on external software and provides an OS Abstraction Layer (OSAL) supporting implementation in both OS and non-OS (baremetal) environments. A compliance support package (CSP) is also provided alongside the SDL to support customers in re-qualification efforts on their system.

Both the SDL and CSP can be accessed via mysecuresw and access can be [requested here](#).

Table 2. Summary of SDL and CSP Product Deliverables

SDL Supported Functions	CSP Deliverables
<p>Diagnostics:Memory BIST, Logic BIST, ECC and Parity, ECC Aggregator, Error Signaling Module, R5F Lockstep (CCM)</p> <p>Safety Features: Clock Monitor, Voltage Monitors, Temperature Sensors, Timeout/Isolation Gaskets, Watchdog Timers, R5F MPU, PMU, VIM, and RAT Support</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirements, test plan and reports • Traceability report • Dynamic code coverage analysis report • Static code analysis/MISRA-C report • User guide with safety manual • Software FMEA report

4 Revision History

NOTE: Page numbers for previous revisions may differ from page numbers in the current version.

DATE	REVISION	NOTES
August 2022	*	Initial Release

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